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"No immediate aim of the American people" is "more widely sup-
ported and more insistently voiced than the desire to attack the social evils
of the slums and to provide decent living quarters for at least a portion
of the underprivileged." So wrote the United States Senate Committee
on Education and Labor in its unanimous recommendation of the United
States Housing Act of 1937.1 Indeed it is now common knowledge that
the all too recent slum clearance, low-rent public housing program of the
United States Housing Authority, and of its some 600 cooperating local
authorities, is but one of many related governmental responses-required
by the failure of private institutions - to insistent public demands. 2 In
a country where "every third home" is substandard on "simple physical
grounds alone" ("without considering overcrowding"),' every needed
and relevant power of government -planning, spending, taxing, con-
demning, owning, lending, policing, regulating - has been marshalled at
every level - federal, regional, state, and local - for the achievement of
a new public goal: the provision of healthful homes, in well planned
communities, for all citizens, at prices that they can afford to pay. In
* A reply to Russell, Tax Status of Public Housing (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 381, and
a criticism of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Columbus Metropolitan
Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N. E. (2d) 437 (1942).
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The writers are indebted to Mr. Asher Lans, a former editor of the YALE LAW JoUR-
NAL, for helpful suggestions.
1. SEN. RP. No. 933, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 2.
2. The "public housing" with which this article is concerned is the housing fur-
nished by local public authorities, aided by federal loans and subsidy, to low-income fami-
lies for whom "private enterprise" has not been able to build an adequate supply of
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings and who have, therefore, been compelled to live in
slum-type, substandard houses. For reasons none too obscure in the pressure-group or-
ganization of our society, it is this "public housing" which has been most subjected to
legal attack It should be noted, however, that all the recent governmental intervention
in housing-even the government's assumption of formerly "private" risks through the
FHA and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation-are equally serious de-
partures from traditional laissez-faire economic concepts. An anthropological observer
might find it hard to understand why all such intervention does not, in terms of tradi-
tional legal syntax, raise the same question of "public purpose" (see pages 43-45 infra).
3. BAUER, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO PUBLIC HOUSING (1940) 16.
4. For elaboration of the familiar history of why this has come to pass, see: EmBN-
STFiN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC HOUSING (1940); WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS
(1938); ABRAMS, REvOLUTION ix LAND (1939); BAUER, MODERN HoUSING (1934) and
A CITIzEN'S GUIDE TO PUBLIC HOUSING (1940); WOOD, INTRODUCTION TO HOUSING
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addition to the United States Housing Authority and its cooperating
state and local authorities, a host of other new agencies- the HOLC,
the FHA, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Farm Security Administration,
the TVA, and now the National Housing Agency and the Rent Division
of OPA- all bear indubitable testimony to the fact that "housing"
has in recent years in the United States achieved the status of a govern-
mental function.'
For the past eighty years our courts have been accustomed to test
such governmental assumption of a new function, if it requires the
expenditure of public funds, by determining whether or not that func-
tion is for a "public purpose."" But the phrase "public purpose" does
(1939); ARoxovIcI, HouSING THE MASSES (1939); FoRD, SLuMS AND HOUSING (1936);
POST, THE CHALLENGE OF HOUSING (1933); STONE & DENON, TNEC REP., TowiAnn
MoR HousiNG, Monograph 8 (1940); NATIONAL RErsoURCES PLANuma Eoam, Oun
CF Es: THEIR ROLE IN THE NATIONAL ECONo-.r (1937), and Housnixo THM CoNTIN:-
ING PROBLE= (1940); MUnFoaR, THE CULTURE or CITIES (1938).
How late, compared with other civilized countries, the United States was in accept-
ing this public responsibility, can be gleaned from Comment, Low-Cost Housing: A
European Survey (1942) 37 ILL. L. REv. 167.
For a persuasive statement of housing standards based on fundamental physiological
and psychological needs, see AERIC.AN PUBLIC HEALTH Ass'., ComiTTrE ON HVGIE.L
or HousING, BASIC PRINCIPLES or HEALTHFUL HousING (2d ed. 1939).
5. To the citations in note 4 supra, add ScHa.kFFR, STATE HUUsuNt; Arem:eIEs
(1942); Wallace, Survey of Federal Legislation Affecting Private Home Financing
Since 1932 (1938) 5 LAW & CONTrEaP. PRoB. 481.
Mention might also be made of the hundreds of relatively recent federal, regional,
state, and local "planning agencies." See publications by the NATioNAL Rrotwrs
PLANNING BOARD: NATIONAL RESOURCES DEELOP.MENT REFoRT (1942), rEio:.L
PLANNING (1938), THE FUTURE OF STATE PLANNING (1938); and see WVALrKn, THE
PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN GOIERNMENT (1941).
6. 1 COOLEY, TAxATION (4th ed. 1924) §87; 5 McQuILLn, MUmcIPAL CouroA-
ToNs (2d ed. 1928) §§2323, 2324; McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18
CALIF. L. REv. 137, 241; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use i the Law of Eminent
Domain (1940) 20 B. U. L. REv. 615.
The term "public use" is frequently used interchangeably vth "public purpose" by
many present day judges and writers. Others, however, in conformity with what they
conceive to be traditional legal usage, seek to confine "public use!' to tests of eminent
domain and "public purpose" to tests of taxing and spending. When dealing with gov-
ernmental aid to private enterprises, courts have in general been more villing to exp:and
"public use" and allow private interests to exercise eminent domain than they have
been to expand "public purpose" and permit governmental units to make public funds
available to such private interests in the form of a subsidy. For this distinction there
is good reason; possibilities of abuse are obviously greater in the expenditure of public
funds for private interests than in permitting such interests to aid themselves by emi-
nent domain. When dealing with public undertakings, where all property is to be pub-
licly owned and possibilities of private profit are excluded, there would, however, seem
to be no rational basis for making a distinction between tests for eminent domain and
for taxing and spending. If the undertaking is a governmental responsibility, it would
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not admit of exact definition; it is of too high abstraction to give specific
direction to a court which is asked to limit the power of another govern-
mental branch to expend public funds, or to borrow money, or to exempt
property from general taxation. Indeed its chief virtue is in its infinite
expansibility, which has permitted judges to respond to changing public
opinion as to the goals of a democratic society and to the changing
political, social, and economic factors which condition the achievement
of such goals.
Before 1850 the courts paid little attention to any of the functions
assumed by local governments in managing local affairs. The prevailing
judicial attitude seems to have been that the mere act of governmental
assumption automatically endowed an activity with all necessary "public"
character. It was only after countless hamlets in the nation had, during
the period of frenzied railroad promotion, bankrupted themselves in order
to induce railroad companies to run tracks their way, and had then
appealed to the courts in an effort to avoid payment of their obligations,
that a different attitude began to appear. In these cases of contested
railroad subsidies the courts for the first time considered seriously the
argument that every government sponsored activity is not automatically
for a "public" purpose, and that governmental expenditures should be
restricted to a severely limited class of "non-private" functions.7 Al-
though this argument met with little practical success in these particular
cases, its usefulness in furthering the laissez-faire economic philosophy
of that time was soon recognized. In consequence, despite its rather shady
origin, it shortly became one of the most useful legal tools in later nine-
teenth century attempts to curtail governmental activities which were
alleged to compete with "private" enterprise.
As public needs and dominant social attitudes changed, however, the
courts, to keep pace with such change, gradually discarded the laisscz-
faire criteria, which alone gave restrictive force to the new-found con-
seem absurd to deny any governmental powers which might contribute to the success of
the undertaking. What point could there be, for example, in granting eminent domain
to a municipal corporation for condemning the site of a public housing project and yet
denying the power to expend public funds to pay for this site? Compare the opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, quoted
in the text, infra p. 48. In deference to the niceties of legal scholarship, however, since
this article is concerned primarily with taxing and spending, the term "public purpose"
will be used throughout.
7. The "first clear-cut sfatement of the doctrine" is found in the decision of Chief
Justice Black of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sharpless v. The Mayor of Phila-
delphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). For an excellent discussion of the origins and growth of
the public purpose doctrine as a limitation on the taxing and spending power of govern-
ment, see McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CALIF. L. RIv. 137. For
a similar history of the public use' concept in eminent domain, see Nichols, The Mcan-
ing of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain (1940) 20 B. U. L. Rxv. 615.
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cept. Thus, one by one, such "rules" s as that, unless a natural monopoly
existed, the field must be left to private initiative; that governments
could assume only such functions as were vital to community existence
and were not adequately provided by private capital; that the activity
must be equally beneficial to every member of the community and must
be open to use by all the people;' and that any project which openly
competed with private enterprises in the same field was necessarily private
in character, were either covertly emasculated or openly repudiated by
courts in those situations where obvious social needs called for judicial
sanction of the governmental activity in question.'" As a result of these
doctrinal changes, there has been such expansion of "public purpose"
that today, despite its firm establishment in the standard legal vocabulary,
it seldom is permitted actually to interfere with activities which the
public clearly insists that its government assume. From the slow process
of judicial itemization, specific functions of the greatest variety have
emerged - in conformity with contemporary needs and conceptions of
policy- as clearly public in character."
Until June of this year, public housing projects, established under
the USHA"2 local authority plan to provide healthful homes for families
of low income who cannot otherwise obtain such homes, seemed to have
been irretrievably placed in this category of settled public purpose. Recent
decisions by the highest courts, "liberal" and "conservative" alike, of
S. These "rules" are obviously loose, overlapping generalizations.
9. An irresponsible importation from the field of eminent domain, where it has
also been largely discarded. See note 67 infra.
10. Jones v. Portland, 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41 (1915), aff'd, 245 U. S. 217
(1917); Green v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11 (1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233
(1920); Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. XV. 172 (1926), aff'd pcr
curiam, 275 U. S. 504 (1927); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.
495 (1937). See also Moxey, Is Govcnnent Mcrchandising Consftliional? (1913) 52
Am. L. REv. 215.
The most extensive "dilution of public purpose" is, of course, in the decisions sus-
taining direct municipal subsidies to private enterprises as a mode of inter-state or inter-
municipal competition for industry. Albritton v. Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799
(1938) (sophisticated opinion sustaining municipal building of factories for leasing to
private interests). Cf. Carroll v. Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N. N%. 652 (1935);
Fernandia v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So. 454 (1940) ; Comment (1941) 9 Dunx B. A. J.
15; Comment (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rnv. 775; Note (1938) 47 Ymx L. J. 1412.
11. As, for example, street railroads, water works, light and power plants, gas worl:s,
swimming pools, airports, and playgrounds. See 1 Coon,, TAXATioN (4th ed. 1924)
§§200-213; 5 M1CQuLLIx, MuN ICiP:AL Coxr0a.*Tioxs (2d ed. 1928) §§2325-2328.
12. Now known, under the President's Executive Order of February 24, 1942, setting
up the National Housing Agency, as the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA).
ExEc. ORDER 9070, 7 FED. REG. 1529 (Feb. 26, 1942). For exposition of the changes,
irrelevant here, effected by this order, see Weintraub and Tough, Federal Horing and
World War I1 (1942) 18 J. OF LAND & P. U. ECoN. 155. The old name (USHA) is
retained throughout this article for the sake of clarity.
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twenty-three states 3 specifically on the point, 4 plus numerous decisions
holding expenditures to be for a "public purpose" when for such activities
13. In re Opinions of the Justices, 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535 (1938) ; Humphrey v.
Phoenix, 55 Ariz. 374, 102 P. (2d) 82 (1940); Hogue v. Housing Authority of North
Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263, 144 S. W. (2d) 49 (1940); Housing Authority of Los An-
geles County v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. (2d) 437, 94 P. (2d) 794 (1939); The Moffat Tun-
nel Improvement District v. The Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver,
125 P. (2d) 138 (Colo. 1942); State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So.
100 (1941) ; State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131 (1940), sup-
plem. op., 143 Fla. 876, 197 So. 549 (1940) ; Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville,
133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938) ; Williamson v. Housing Authority of the City of Augus-
ta, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S. E. 43 (1938) ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356h,
19 N. E. (2d) 193 (1939) ; Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 215 Ind.
330, 19 N. E. (2d) 741 (1939) ; State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New Or-
leans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938) ; Matthaei v. Housing Authority of Baltimore, 177
Md. 506, 9 A. (2d) 835 (1939) ; Allydonn Realty Corporation v. Holyoke Housing Au-
thority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N. E. (2d) 665 (1939); Laret Investment Co. v, Dickmann,
345 Mo. 449, 134 S. W. (2d) 65 (1939) ; Rutherford v. Great Falls, 107 Mont. 512, 86 P.
(2d) 656 (1939); Lennox v. Housing Authority of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N. W.
451, 291 N. W. 100 (1940); Romano v. Housing Authority of Newark, 124 N. J. L. 452,
12 A. (2d) 384 (1940); Wells v. Housing Authority of Wilmington, 213 N. C. 744, 197
S. E. 693 (1938) ; Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atd. 834
(1938); MeNulty v. Owens, 188 S. C. 377, 199 S. E. 425 (1938); Knoxville Housing
Authority v. Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76, 123 S. W. (2d) 1085 (1939) ; Housing Author-
ity of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S. W. (2d) 79, 130 A. L. R. 1053
(1940) ; Mumpower v. Housing Authority of the City of Bristol, 176 Va. 426, 11 S. E.
(2d) 732 (1940); Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Housing Authority, 121 W. Va. 319,
3 S. E. (2d) 502 (1939). In addition to these twenty-three decisions, the following case,:
contain at least a strong implication of tax exemption: Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97,
103 S. W. (2d) 651 (1937); New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y.
333, 1 N. E. (2d) 153 (1936). All of these state decisions are collected in Notes in
130 A. L. R. 1069 (1941) and 133 A. L. R. 365 (1941). For discussion, see: Nichols,
Condemnation for Public Housing (1940) 5 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL Gov. 122; Com-
ment (1937) 36 MIc~. L. REV. 275; Comment (1941) 26 MINN. L. Riv. 81; Note
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1519; (1940) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 862; (1938) 87 U. or PA.
L. Ray. 118; KEYsERLIN, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE HOUSING FIELD (National Resources
Committee, Housing Monograph Series, No. 2, 1939) 42.
Forerunners to the above cited decisions, and expressing the same enlightened judi-
cial understanding of "public purpose," are First Municipality v. MeDonough, 2 Rob.
244 (La. 1842); Veterans' Welfare Board v. Jordan, 189 Cal. 124, 208 Pac. 284
(1922); Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal. App. 1, 266 Pac. 1029 (1928); Simon v. O'Toole,
108 N. J. L. 32, 155 At. 449 (1931), aff'd, 108 N. J. L. 549, 158 Atl. 543 (1932); Green
v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11 (1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233 (1920). See Robin-
son, Public Housing in Massachusetts (1938) 18 B. U. L. REv. 83.
The New York courts have sustained the tax exemption of buildings and improve-
ments erected by limited dividend companies, even though such companies allow, of
course, a certain amount of profit to private enterprise. Roche v. Sexton, 268 N. Y. 594,
198 N. E. 420 (1935); Matter of Mount Hope Development Co. v. James, 258 N. Y.
510, 180 N. E. 252 (1932) ; Mars Realty Corp. v. Sexton, 141 Misc. 622, 253 N. Y. Supp.
15 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
It is worth noting that the much discredited United States v. Certain Lands in the
City of Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), which Mr. Russell (at 381,
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as gasoline filling stations,'; tourists' camps,"' public golf courses,17 ice
plants,'" municipal celebrations, 19 city bands,"0 and opera houses"1 (all of
which might well be regarded from any conceivable point of view as far
more questionable than housing), appeared so conclusive that the point
was generally conceded to be one which present day courts would accept
as axiomatic.2
In upholding the public character of IJSHA-approved local housing
projects, the courts of the twenty-three states mentioned above relied,
either directly or vicariously by citation, upon the well documented facts
that slum clearance and the provision of sanitary low-rent housing de-
crease danger of epidemics, raise general public health, reduce crime,
n. 3) cites as "holding that the federal government had no power to condemn land for
low-rent housing projects because taking of land for such purpose was not a taking for a
public use," has been rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Oklahoma v. Sanders, 94 F. (2d)
323 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938). Cf. EBENSTETI, op. cit. supra note 4, at 32; Corwin, Consti-
tutional Aspects of Federal Housing (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 131; Comment (1941)
39 Micia. L. Rav. 457.
14. This unanimity of decision is especially striking because of the substantial differ-
ences in the various constitutional and statutory provisions involved [e.g., Ih re Opinions
of the Justices, 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535 (1938) (property exempt as property of muni-
cipal corporation); Iarvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183
So. 145 (193S) (project exempt as property for municipal purposes); Mumpower v.
Housing Authority of City of Bristol, 176 Va. 426, 11 S. E. (2d) 732 (1940) (project
exempt as property of political subdivision); Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Hous-
ing Authority, 121 V. Va. 319, 3 S. E. (2d) 502 (1939) (project exempt as "pub-
lic property"); Williamson v. Housing Authority of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 185
Ga. 673, 199 S. E. 43 (1938) (project exempt both as "a purely public charity" and as
public property) ; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 I1. 356, 19 X. . (2d) 193
(1939) (project exempt as public charity)], and because usually stare decisis was
either of no assistance altogether or favored a conclusion contrary to that reached by the
court. For example, see Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Ma_.
288, 23 X. E. (2d) 665 (1939). Cf. Brammer v. Housing Authority of the Birm-
ingham District, 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256 (1940); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 At. 834 (1938).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U. S. 504 (1927).
16. State ex rel. Minner v. Dodge City, 123 Kan. 316, 255 Pac. 387 (1927).
17. Booth v. 'Minneapolis, 163 Minn. 223, 203 N. V. 625 (1925).
18. Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pa(. 677 (1926).
19. Schieffelin v. Hylan, 236 N. Y. 254, 140 N. E. 689 (1923).
20. Goodnight v. Wellington, 118 Tex. 207, 13 S. W. (2d) 353 (1929).
21. See Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 581-582, 133 Pac. 294, 295-296 (1913).
22. Compare Abrams, Book Review (1940) 50 YAmE L. J. 361: "Dominating the
whole issue in the dark days of 1934 was a question that now sounds as distant and for-
gotten as 'The Mferry Widow': is public housing a public use for which public monies
could be spent and private property acquired?" See also B.ium, A CITIZE:'s Guimz rf,
PuBic HOUSING (1940) 35: "Any doubts as to the legality of legislation essential
for slum clearance and low-rent housing have been completely dispelled .. ."
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cut juvenile delinquency, reduce immbrality, lower economic waste by
reducing health, police and fire protection costs, make better citizens,
eliminate fire hazards, increase general land values in the vicinity, cut
the accident rate, and prevent the cancerous spread of slums to uninfected
areas.2 3 For the better achievement of such generally preferred events,
these courts have insisted that non-profit public housing authorities should
be accorded not only tax-exemption, but also all relevant and neces-
sary governmental powers. This common jidicial attitude was well
stated in the first, and still leading, case of New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller,24 which sustained a legislative grant of eminent
domain to local public housing authorities. There the New York Court
of Appeals announced in often-quoted words:
"The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health,
safety and general welfare of the public. All its complicated activities
have that simple end in view. Its power plant for the purpose con-
sists of the power of taxation, the police power and the power of
eminent domain. Whenever there arises, in the state, a condition
of affairs holding a substantial menace to the public health, safety
or general welfare, it becomes the duty of the government to apply
whatever power is necessary and appropriate to check it. There are
differences in the nature and characteristics of the powers, though
distinction between them is often fine . . . But if the menace is
serious enough to the public to warrant public action and the power
applied is reasonably and fairly calculated to check it, and bears a
reasonable relation to the evil, it seems to be constitutionally imma-
terial whether one or another. of the sovereign powers is employed."
For the removal of such "substantial menaces" to the public health,
safety and general welfare as slums, all of these courts have either
expressly recognized or taken for granted the completely complementary
character, in any effective program, of slum clearance and the provision
of new low-rent housing. It is the demolition of unhealthful living
conditions, not the mere physical razing of unhealthy buildings, that is
the object of insistent public demand; such demolition cannot- because
of the failure of private enterprise to furnish an adequate supply of
healthful low-rent homes25 -be achieved without governmental provi-
23. The final consideration may not be as obvious as the others. For an excellent
description of how slum areas blight, and eventually make slums of, adjacent areas, see
WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS (1938) 17.
24. 270 N. Y. 333, 340-341, 1 N. E. (2d) 153, 155 (1936). Cf. Allydonn Realty
Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N. E. (2d) 665, 670 (1939).
25. Surveys have made it clear that families with incomes ranging not only from
$600 to $1,200 per annum but considerably higher, and who can afford rentals of $10
to $25 per month, are not being adequately provided with safe and sanitary housing by
private enterprise. See, for example, SEN. REP, No. 933, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)
[Vol. 52: 42
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sion of new housing facilities, within the reach of low-income families,
to replace slum and substandard dwellings. -0
In the light of this well-reasoned and almost overwhelming judicial
precedent, two recent and surprisingly similar arguments that typical
USHA local housing authority projects are not entitled to tax exemption
would seem plainly untenable from the perspective of either law or
policy. The first of these is set forth in an article on the "Tax Status
of Public Housing" by Mr. Horace Russell in the June issue of the
American Bar Association Journal. 7 Starting from the convenient but
unorthodox premise that even in the case of governent-oweid property
"there would appear to be a constant presumption in favor of taxa-
bility,"28 rebuttable "only by evidence of current use for non-taxable
5, 6, 7, 9. Especially significant is the statement of the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor in this Report (at 9) that:
"The actual results of the Federal Housing Administration's efforts to
induce private capital into the low-rent housing field have been 43 projects with
an average rent per room. of $13.32 per month. This rent level hardly serves
families with incomes under $3,300 per year-and such families comprised four-
fifths of the total population even in 1929." (emphasis supplied).
The hearings before the TNEC also indicate clearly that private enterprise has
failed to provide adequately for families with incomes ranging from $600 to $1200 per
year and who can afford rentals of from $10 to $,-25 per month. These hearings show that
4,000,000 dwellings in the United States are unfit for human habitation even by the
lowest standards, and that, if lack of proper sanitary facilities be taken as a criterion,
appro.imately a million and a half more must also be classed as substandard. They also
show that, aside from the shortage already in existence, private enterprise is failing mis-
erably to meet annual requirements, i.e.. the bare maintenance of housing facilities, fur
non-farm families of low income. Thus, while 60,000 non-farm dwelling units to rent at
$10 per month were required in 193S and 1939 merely to maintain the already inadequate
supply of facilities for families with $10-a-week incomes, practically nu dwelling units
of this nature were constructed by private enterprise in 1938. Out of the 136,0E00 non-
farm dwellings needed for families who can afford a $10-to-V0-a-month rental, only
1/10 of 1% of the necessary amount was provided; and of the 125,000 new dw.elling units
needed for families who can afford to pay a $20-to-$30-a-month rental, only 10% of the
necessary number of dwelling units was provided by private enterprise. The testimony
shox'ed that substantially no building was being done which wvould b2 available for
persons having an income of $1,500 a year or less. It showed that, while 92% of the
families in the United States had incomes of ,$2,500 or less in 1935, only 4S% of the
housing built on the average in 1930-37 was in that range. Hcarings beLfore IMe Tem-
porary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Pt. 11, 49553-4%6,
4975-4980, 5433, 5479. Compare STOxE & DNTO., TNEC R u., Tow.=to M. r Hous-
Ii=G, Monograph 8 (1940) 21-29, 90; EnEsstrrs, Tap Law or Pu uc IHoUsIx;G (1940)
5; Post, T m CHALLENGE or HOuSiNG (1933) passim.
26. Merely to demolish slum-type dwellings, occupied by families for whom private
enterprise cannot supply healthful homes, is at best to send these families to create new
slums elsewhere.
27. Russell, Tax Statius of Public Housing (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 331. 'Mr. Russell
is General Counsel of the United States Savings and Loan League. For purposes of con-
venience, this article will be cited hereafter as Russell.
28. Id. at 393.
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purposes," 29 Mr. Russell argues that the determination that public hous-
ing projects are used for charitable or public purposes must be estab-
lished annually to entitle them to tax exemption for that year. From his
repeated emphasis upon such phrases as "families of lowest income" and
"very lowest, slum-level families," and from the whole pattern of his
article, it is clear - though his language is nowhere completely explicit
- that what Mr. Russell proposes as a criterion of "public purpose"
in such annual reexaminations of public housing projects is the practi-
cally complete poverty of the tenants who are served.8° Thus, he sug-
29. Russell, 383.
30. The whole tone of the article, and the impression to be gained from his conclu-
sions, is clearly that he objects to tax exemption of property serving others than the des-
titute. Thus, in his discussion of Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356,
19 N. E. (2d) 193 (1939), which held the property of the Peoria Housing Authority exempt
as property "devoted exclusively to a charitable purpose" (370 Ill. 356, 367), Mr. Rus-
sell insists (at 383) that the "court stressed the point that the housing units in question
were available only to families of the lowest income class" (emphasis supplied), whereas
the court's phrase was simply "families of low income." It is possible, by scanning his
language with especial meticulousness and by giving the most restricted meaning pos-
sible to his statements, to argue that his thesis is not that only projects serving the
absolutely poverty-stricken should be tax exempt, but that any projects serving those
whom private enterprise is not providing with decent accommodations are entitled to
exemption. But when he writes (at 384) that, "when any project caters to families above
the lowest or slum-level income group," it supplies "a need which private facilities could
fill at a price which one not in the lowest income group could afford to pay," he seems
to assume that private enterprise is providing more decent accommodations at lower
prices than the facts warrant. He offers no factual basis for this assumption, nor does
he discuss the range of rentals or incomes among slum-dwelling families. He merely
states (at 382) that rents in the public housing projects "range from about $10.00 per
month to about $25.00 per month" and that dwelling units "are generally rented to tenants
of good credit having a reliable income ranging from about $600 to about $1,200 per an-
num," and offers in contrast (at 384) an undefined (unless a reference, at 382, to tenants
of "no income" or of "extremely uncertain income" is a definition) category of "lowest
or slum-level income" groups. The clear implication is that urban families with an in-
come of $600 to $1,200 a year can obtain decent housing without government help.
It seems unnecessary to belabor authorities to prove the complete unreality of this
assumption. To even the most casual observer it must be obvious that decent quarters--
defining "decent" in terms of sufficient space, light, air and sanitary facilities to provide
for living at a level above the sub-human-are not presently available (wholly apart
from war conditions, which can only augment shortages and inflate prices for the future)
at rentals of between $10 and $25 per month. Let Mr. Russell, or anyone else, spend it
day in inspecting the quarters available to an average family of four at these rentals in
any large city north of the Mason and Dixon line. Or let him approach any reputable
building contractor in the same area and suggest that he build quarters in which he would
be willing to house his family at a price which would permit profitable rental at a figure
of $20 per month, including heat. What he will see and what he will hear will be more
convincing than any charts or statistics. The factors which condition this high cost of
housing are too involved for exposition here, including, as they do, a disorganized, re-
straint-ridden construction industry, inflated urban land costs, regressive taxation, non-
existent or chaotic land-use "planning," and the entire home financing structure. Suffice
it to say that all of these factors, and many others, combine to make it impossible for
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gests that "the purpose of a housing project" continues "to be public
only so long as it" performs "the function of eradicating slums by lifting
families of lowest income out of such areas and placing them in modem
housing units" and ceases to be public when it "ceases to provide for
the very lowest, slum-level families" and "benefits only a small fraction
of the general public, not of the lowest economic level." 3 1 Having already
described existing public housing projects as "generally rented to tenants
of good credit having a reliable income ranging from about $600 to
about $1200 per annum"3 and "built and operated upon a basis to provide
the facilities, services and accommodations of the modern apartment or
apartment hotel,"33 Mr. Russell therefore conveys the notion that such
projects are not for a public purpose since "Generally speaking, none of
these projects have admitted tenants having no income, nor have they
admitted tenants of poor credit, nor have they admitted tenants having
the lowest income in the country nor have they admitted tenants of an
extremely uncertain income."'3- How "public purpose" suddenly acquires
such a definite, limited, absolutistic meaning, despite the great weight of
popular, legislatie and judicial opinion to the contrary, is not made dear.
But from such premises Mr. Russell easily concludes that public housing
projects renting to tenants more prosperous than "the lowest" or "the
very lowest slum-level families" are not entitled to tax exemption, and
that any exemption granted them is "discrimination in favor of a class"
and "imposes an extra burden on similar private activities not so
exempt." 
36
The second espousal of this anachronistic view, coinciding with the
Russell theory in underlying concept as well as in time, is the recent
five-to-two decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus Mfetro-
politan Housing Authority v. Thatcher,37 in which it was held that a
private interests profitably to produce adequate dwellings at a price wvithin reach of the
low income segment of our population. See note 25 supra. For an illuminating analysis
of the entire construction industry, describing at least some causes of the high cost of
housing, see STO E & DE-ToN. TNEC REP., Tow.-A Mom- Housmru, mknograph S
(1940). See also TNEC Hearings, op. cit. suPra note 25.
It may be argued that, even though $600 to $1,200 income families now live in the
slums, decent housing should be provided first for families of still lower income. But a
start had to be made somewhere, and ex-actly where it should be made would appear to
be a question of policy for the legislature to determine. In any event, this is an argu-
ment not for eliminating local subsidy, but rather for increasing it.
31. Russell, 393.
32. Id. at 382.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 384.
36. Ibid.
37. 140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N. E. (2d) 437 (1942). Judges Williams and Zimnernan
dissented. Noted in 57 AmumcECN Crr 76-77 (June, 1942). Hereinafter cited as the
Columbus case.
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municipally controlled, typical USHA-qualified public housing project
which admits tenants who can afford to pay rent is not entitled to tax
exemption under the relevant Ohio statutes and constitutional restrictions.
The reasoning by which the Ohio Court, confronted by an apparent
express declaration of tax exemption in the Ohio Housing Authority
Act and by its own previous holding in State ex rel. Ellis v. Sherrill-'
that this statute was constitutional, was able to reach its result requires
exposition at some length. The Constitution of Ohio provides, in part,
in Section 2 of Article XII, that:
"Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule
according to value . . . and without limiting the general power,
subject to the provisions of article I of this constitution, to deter-
mine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions there-
from, general laws may be passed to exempt . . .public property
used exclusively for any public purpose . . . " (emphasis supplied).
The limiting provisions of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, referred
to in the above section, include an "equal protection' clause.80  In its
quotation of this section of the Constitution the Court italicized both
this limitation and the word "exclusively." The general tax exemption
law, enacted by the Ohio Legislature pursuant to this constitutional
power, states that:
"Real or personal property belonging exclusively to the st,ate or
United States, and public property used for a public purpose shall
be exempt from taxation."
40
Noting the absence of the word "exclusively" from the latter clause
of this statute, and remarking that "the duty of this court to give a
statute a constitutional construction, if possible, needs no citation,"
' 41
the Ohio Court supplied the missing word on the ground that its in-
clusion was obviously the legislative intent. With this interpretation of
the general statute established, the Court next examined the Ohio Hous-
ing Authority Act, which states that:
"All property, both real and personal, acquired, owned, leased,
rented or operated by the housing authority shall be deemed public
property for public use . . . "4
38. 136 Ohio St. 328, 25 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940).
39. Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution reads:
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or
abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privi-
leges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or
repealed by the general assembly."
40. OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 5351.
41. Columbus case, 440.
42. OHIo GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 1078-36. The substitution here of the
word "use" for the word "purpose" is an example of the indiscriminate interchange re-
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Here again the Court noted the absence of the word "exclusively," but
this time, reciting only "we assume that the Legislature was mindful
of the constitutional limitation,"43 it rcfitscd to supply it on the apparent,
but not clearly articulated, ground that so to supply the word would
create an express legislative declaration of tax exemption which (assum-
ing-what the Court subsequently found- that property so "leased,
rented or operated" was not held for a public purpose) would be un-
constitutional. Thus, disregarding the obvious intent of the legislature,
the Court was able to conclude that the omission by the legislature of
the word "exclusively" in the statute (the legislature being presumed
to know the constitutional limitations) showed that the Ohio Housing
Authority Act was not intended to exempt all housing projects, comply-
ing with its requirements, from general taxation. What other purpose
the legislature might have had in inserting in the statute the words "shall
be deemed public property for public use," the Court did not attempt
to say.4 4 In such manner, however, it fulfilled its duty, as it saw it, to
give the statute a constitutional construction if possible, and also achieved
the practical result of stripping the statute of all real effectiveness without
the necessity of reconsidering, in express terms, whether or not it was
constitutional."5
With the express legislative declaration of public purpose in the Hous-
ing Authority Act itself thus eliminated, the only remaining problem
before the Court was that of whether projects constructed under the
Act, and complying with all its requirements, were entitled to exemption
under the general tax exemption statute recited above as "public property"
used exclusively "for a public purpose." Such a determination, the
Court assumed, was clearly judicial business requiring careful investi-
gation. Since the Ohio Housing Authority Act expressly designates local
authorities established in conformity with its terms as "bodies corporate
and politic," the court did not question the fact that the property of
such authorities was public property; but, like Mr. Russell, it insisted
that general statutory tax exemption of even publicly owned property
ferred to above in note 6. Eminent domain is provided for in the preceding section of
the Act. OHio GEN. CODE Axx. (Page, 1937) § 1078-35.
43. Columbus case, 440.
44. Reading § 1078-36 in terms of the preamble to the statute contained in the first
paragraph of § 1078-30, the final reference of the section to "public inspection" is inconse-
quential. Emphasis upon such reference would ignore common interpretation. Cf. the
opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Ohio, cited in the annotation to § 1078-36.
45. Section 2, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides:
". ... No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme
court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, Ccept in
the affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law.' uncon-
stitutional and void . . ."
The Columbus case was not an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. Recall
that two judges dissented.
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must be strictly construed. Then, in disregard of the necessary inter-
dependence of slum clearance and rehousing in any practicable program,
it distinguished between the "former" use of the property -(demolition of
substandard dwellings on the project site) and the "present" use (low-
rent housing), and concluded that while the physical clearance was being
carried on the property was held for a public purpose and therefore tax
exempt, but that after the project was completed and renting had begun, it
could no longer be so classified. Grounding its decision firmly on Broom's
Legal Maxims and Lord Coke, the Court here minced no words :
"It seems to us clear that where dwellings are leased to family
units for the purposes of private homes, the use of such dwellings
is private and not public. Under Anglo-Saxon law and tradition,
there is nothing more private than one's home. Broom's Legal
Maxims, 9th Ed., 283, Semayne's Case, 5 Coke, 91, 77 Eng. Rep.
R., 194. That every man's house is his castle has not yet been
erased from our laws.
"Furthermore, a tax advantage equal to $3.13 per month on
home rental given to a selected few persons who are not paupers
and who are not aged, infirm or without means of support is
violative of the provisions of Section 2 of Article XII and Section
2 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio [public purpose and equal
protection requirements]. Such tax exemption would shift the tax
burden to other home owners and taxpayers."
It emphasized testimony to the effect that the tenants must be able to
pay the rents charged and that they were selected from substandard
houses everywhere and not merely from the particular slums demolished.41
It was shocked, furthermore, to note that under the housing authority's
substandard housing score sheet "a very large portion if indeed not a
majority of the houses in this state could be declared substandard."
'48
46. Columbus case, 442.
Broom's maxim is: Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium. But even
Seinayne's Case states that, though "every man's house is his castle," in all cases where
the King is a party the sheriff may break the house 1
47. The Ohio Court's assumption is the same as that of Mr. Russell: that tenants
who can afford to pay an average monthly rental, including heat, light, gas and water,
of $18.25 to $19.25 per month (the scale of rents charged by the project in question) can
get adequate living quarters in privately owned property and, hence, that there is no
need for public housing projects. For demonstration of the lack of factual basis for
this assumption, see notes 25 and 30 supra.
48. Columbus case, 442. Briefly, the Court emphasized the fact that there was evi-
dence before the Board of Tax Appeals which showed that the general regulations pre-
scribed by the local housing authority could be interpreted to permit admission of tenants
who came from homes that were substandard only in the sense that they did not have
inside water or bathroom facilities or electric lights. But there was nothing in the evi-
dence to indicate that the tenants actually selected for the project did come from such
dwellings. In other words, the Court based its decision not upon the facts, but upon the
theoretical possibilities.
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In order to grasp the full practical effect which the Russell theory
and the Ohio decision (hereinafter referred to jointly as the Ohio-Russell
theory) could have on the entire USHA program, the only program of
slum clearance and public housing which is at present effectively func-
tioning, some further understanding of the purposes and structure of
that program is essential.4 9
It must be realized at the outset that the USHA was designed to
meet the need of those in our society who, though having some income,
can not pay a sufficient rental to achieve decent, sanitary living quarters.
Based on the fact that private industry, even when aided by government
guarantees, cannot provide healthful housing at rents which the lower-
income-third of the population can afford to pay, the plan clearly recog-
nized that direct subsidy in the form of a rental admittedly below the
economic rent of the quarters provided was essential. It was realized
that only by providing such quarters could the costly and disgraceful
slums of our cities be eventually eliminated, and healthful living condi-
tions provided for people now living in slum-type substandard houses.
The fact can not be over emphasized that the program was never in-
tended simply to provide free living quarters 0 It was an ex-pression of
the realization that there are grades of social need between abject poverty
and plenty, and that those who need some help in order to achieve the
basic necessities of life, and are able and willing to contribute the balance
themselves, are as deserving of aid as those who can or will not con-
tribute anything. That this principle was accepted and endorsed by the
majority of the people is shown not alone by the enactment of the federal
statute but also by the adoption by almost forty states of enabling statutes
providing for the establishment of local housing authorities to put the
principle in operation.
The plan set up to achieve this purpose can be briefly stated. The
state enabling statute provides for the formation of local housing
authorities as "public bodies corporate and politic," to cooperate with
49. For a more extended description see Tretter, Public Housing Finance (1941) 54
H.-v. L. Rcv. 1325. See also Report of Conmittee on the Law of Housing from the
Point of Vim of the Investor, Municipal Law Section, American Bar Association, Sept.
1, 1941.
50. Both the Senate and House Committee Reports on the United States Housing
Act (upon which is based the present low-rent housing program, passed upon by the
23 courts) made it clear that: "The bill would serve the $600 to $1,000 a year family
groups," and that: "Decent housing should be provided, of course, for the lowest ineomne
group that it is possible to reach. It must be recognized, however, that as long as any
rent is to be charged in a project, the people who will occupy the dwellings must have
some income . . . the tenants would . . . have to pay about 55 per cent of the usual
economic rent." (emphasis supplied). SEN. REP. No. 933. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)
13, 14; H. R. REP. No. 1545, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 6. Relief families can and
do, of course, live in public housing projects; but their subsidy is from other than hous-
ing funds.
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the USHA. These local authorities, after proving that there are low
income families in the locality who cannot afford decent housing built
by private enterprise and whose needs will be met by the project, are
eligible for a sixty-year loan from the USHA up to 90% of the project
development cost. The remaining 10% must be otherwise raised (a
requirement designed to stimulate local initiative and interest), and up
to the present time every local housing authority has raised at least this
amount (and in some cases up to 85% of the project cost) by the sale
of bonds to the general public. As security for such loans, the United
States Housing Act provides for the pledging of annual contributions
which the USHA contracts to pay to the local housing authority, and it
is upon such -contributions that private capital must primarily rely for
security. The USHA pays these yearly subsidies, after the project is
built and tenanted, to help bridge the gap between the total annual
charges against the project and the rents which the tenants can afford
to pay. These annual federal contributions must be supplemented by
local contributions equal to at least one-fifth of the federal; and the
combined contributions must be sufficient to insure rentals low enough
to reach tenants of the specified income range. This annual local con-
tribution, vital to any decentralized program, can be met either by direct
grants or by tax exemption of the project; but because constitutional
and statutory debt limitation provisions make it either impossible or
difficult for municipalities to assume the necessary long-term obligations
to make their contributions in cash, and because private capital also
demands assurance of the permanence of the local contributions upon
which the federal contributions are conditioned, all existing low-rent
housing and slum clearance projects have received their local contribu-
tions in the form of tax exemption." Finally, to make certain the "slum
clearance" character of any specific program, the municipality is required
to retire from use a number of slum-type substandard dwellings sub-
stantially equal to the number of new dwellings to be built.
It is apparent that the Ohio-Russell argument strikes at the very
foundations of the above -plan. It strikes at the basic requirements:
(1) that at least some of the tenants must, if slums are to be cleared,
make some contribution to their housing cost12 and (2) that the munici-
51. Cooperation agreements with many cities provide, however, for annual payments
in lieu of taxes, and a general plan has been worked out, by the local authorities and the
USHA, whereby all available excess income from rentals is to be proportionately di-
vided between the local and federal governments so as to reduce both the local tax-
exemption subsidy and the federal cash subsidy.
For this and other specific information, the writers are indebted to officials of the
FPHA (formerly the USHA).
52. By an increase of subsidy, by new economies of operation, and by use of "graded"
rents, it may hereafter become possible for public housing authorities to serve the abso-
lutely indigent; but under even the most hopeful anticipations of the future-if slums
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pality sponsoring the project, and receiving substantial federal assistance
therefor, must raise part of the original cost from sources other than
the federal government and must make continuing contributions par-
tially to match the federal annual contributions. Thus the practical effect
of the application of this theory is obviously to jeopardize at its incep-
tion a social program subscribed to by both the federal government and
well over two-thirds of the states, and to -0hich public and private funds
and credit approximating a billion dollars have already been irrevocably
committed. Especially close scrutiny of this argument and its possible
effects would seem, therefore, to be of urgent importance.
It is in its disinterment of long-buried criteria of "public purpose"
that the Ohio-Russell theory is, as has been indicated above, most com-
pletely out of step with contemporary social, political, and legal trends.
The irrelevance of "Anglo-Saxon law and tradition" that, for purposes
of repelling invaders, "every man's house is his castle," to the question
of whether American municipalities can today subscribe one-fifth of the
subsidy necessary to clear slums and provide healthful housing for the
low-income third of their population, scarcely needs emphasis.0 Even
if there had been no previous decisions specifically determining the status
of such public housing projects, the criteria here adopted to test the
validity of their tax exemption would be untenable today in the light of
the long line of decisions which have so greatly extended the content of
the term "public purpose" in order to enable municipalities the country
over to engage in a wide range of activities in the interests of public
are to be cleared on an appropriate scale--some tenants must, contrary to the Ohio-
Russell theory, be able to pay some rent.
53. The ambiguous middle (or reification of disparate meanings) in the Ohio Court's
syllogism should be obvious. The argument runs: under "Anglo-Saxon law and tra-
dition," for purposes of repelling invaders, "nothing [is] more private than one's home";
public housing projects contain homes; therefore, for purposes of determining tan exemp-
tion, public housing projects must be "private."
More than half a century ago, when dealing with a much more questionable activity,
the New Hampshire Court, with judge Ladd speaking, refused, in Perry v. Keene, 556
N. H. 514, 535 (1876), to be impressed by a similar argument:
"To say of a railroad corporation that it is a private corporation, and
therefore the construction of a railroad is a private purpose, seems to me, in
truth, no more logical, if less absurd, than to say of any officer or agent of the
state,--He is an individual, with all of the private interests and private asso-
ciations of other citizens; therefore the purpose of his office and all of his official
acts is private . . . If the purpose is public, it makes no difference that the
agent by whose hand it is to be attained is private."
Courts do not have to hold, as Mr. Russell suggests (at 3S4 , that a charity is "any-
thing which benefits mankind" or that a public use is "anything %'vhich serves the general
welfare" in order to sustain public housing projects. All they need to hold is that it is
a public purpose for the government to supply healthful homes to that portion of the
population which cannot otherwise obtain such homes because private enterprise has
failed to supply them at a price that they can afford to pay.
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welfare.5" It happens that Ohio itself had previously been in the very
forefront of jurisdictions thus holding municipal projects valid as serv-
ing a public purpose even though the services of such projects were
furnished only on a fee basis and hence were available only to those able
to pay. As early as the 1890's the Ohio Court in the Toledo Gas cases
held that a municipal gas works was sufficienty endowed with a public
purpose to justify both the ependiture of tax funds for its creation"
and the exemption of its property from taxation,"0 and these same cases
have since been considered as among the leading cases on the now
generally accepted extension of the public purpose concept to include
activities of the class commonly termed "public utilities." 7 From the
perspective of these decisions, made some fifty years ago, it is difficult
to see what consistent policy the present Ohio Court, functioning in a
modern climate of opinion and presumably conditioned by contemporary
conceptions of the judicial function, can hope to implement in now hold-
ing that the services supplied by the Columbus Housing Project are not
endowed with a public purpose merely because the services of such
project are not confined to paupers and theoretically compete with
private enterprise.58  It requires a strange logic to reconcile cases
54. See notes 10, 11, 13, and 15-21 inclusive supra.
55. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061 (1891).
56. Toledo v. Hosler, 54 Ohio St. 418, 43 N. E. 583 (1896).
57. 38 Ouio JURISPRUDECcE (1935) § 32, p. 760. For the general acceptance of
"public utilities" as for a public purpose, see 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoaroaAi0Ns
(2d ed. 1928) §§ 1923-1930.
The situations in which the Ohio Court has subsequently held invalid governmental
expenditures or tax exemption for government-owned property as not for a public pur-
pose have been so extreme that they clearly cannot be considered as reflecting a policy
opposed to the Toledo Gas cases. The only such cases which extensive research has re-
vealed are the following: Adams v. Nemyer, 54 Ohio St. 614, 46 N. E. 1154 (1894)
(statute authorizing municipal bond issuance to finance the purchase of land and buildings
for manufacturing purposes, held invalid) ; Cincinnati v. Lewis, 66 Ohio St. 49, 63 N. E.
588 (1902) (see note 83 in!ra) (rural land purchased by city for a waterworks which
was never erected, and subsequently rented as a farm, held not entitled to tax exemption) ;
Auditor of Lucas County v. State ex rel. Boyles, 75 Ohio St. 114, 78 N. E. 955 (1906)
(use of tax funds to provide quarterly pensions for needy blind, held invalid, since insti-
tutions already provided for their care) ; State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71,
102 N. E. 670 (1913) (use of tax funds to support a municipal motion picture theatre,
held not use for a public purpose); Cincinnati v. Harth, 101 Ohio St. 344, 128 N. E.
263 (1920) (authorization of municipal expenditure of tax funds for restoration or
repair of roadbed of privately owned street railway company, held invalid) ; Cleveland
v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N. E. 507 (1936) (use of municipal exhibition hall for
carrying on a general parking garage business, held not for a public purpose, although its
use for parking of municipal vehicles, for the cars of municipal employees, and for general
parking on a fee basis for the convenience of patrons of adjacent public hall and sta-
dium, was held to be permissible).
58. That there is no competition, see notes 25 and 30 supra. That if there were
competition, it would be irrelevant, see note 10 supra. See also Alabama Power Co. v.
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holding that the provision of coweniences for any home in a city is
for a public purpose, with a holding that the provision of the howe
itself, for people who would otherwise be forced to live in dwellings
which lack even adequate sanitary facilities, is not for such a purpose.
It must, furthermore, be remembered that the Ohio-Russell restrictive
definition of "public purpose" is resurrected for application, not to a
new and judicially untried type of project, but to a local activity already
tested and found valid, without a single decision to the contrary, by
the highest courts in twenty-three states.r'o Mr. Russell is so bold as
to suggest that the "question of the tax status of public housing based
upon the facts of the present use of public housing projects is yet to
be decided,"' and blithely disposes of this line of authority with the
conclusion that "all such cases have proceeded upon either an assumed
Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938) (holding damage suffered by existing power distributors as
a result of competition from municipal power plants erected with federal aid to be
davmum absque injuria, giving such distributors no standing to contest the constitu-
tionality of the Act making such aid available to municipalities.)
The question of whether or not the public housing program harms private enterprise
has been well answered in BAUER, A CrIZEN'S GUID To Punrac HousrNG (1940) 70:
"In the first place, only a very small element in the housing process is
actually 'public.' The initiative of the local authority is a sort of catalytic
agent which stimulates all kinds of profitable enterprise within ordinary private
channels. As the New York Times pointed out in a recent editorial:
.. . private capital takes part by investing, private owners by selling
land, private architects and contractors by designing and erecting build-
ings, private manufacturers by making and selling materials, private
artisans by doing the work. Government steps in only to lend money,
to see that the work is well done and to contribute a large enough sub-
sidy to guarantee low rents.'"
Miss Bauer then documents the well known fact that, even with the aid of the FHA,
private industry has not been able to produce buildings within the reach of the lower-
income half of the population.
The fact is that the only competition which the public housing program offers to
private enterprise is a very desirable competition with the landlords of slums v;hose
properties should have long since been vacated and demolished under the police power.
Imagine a vendor of rotten meat complaining about competition from a government
"relief" agency dispensing fresh meat across the street I
It is interesting to note, furthermore, that the "private" real estate people do not raise
any bitter objection to, or deny the "'public purpose" of, the federal government's guaran-
tees of private investment through, for example, the FHA and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. Credit is just as much a part of the whole institutional
structure which supplies homes as is building or renting. Surely in its assumption of pri-
vate credit risks the government is "competing" with private enterprise I The truth is, of
course, as one of the writers has elsewhere tried to indicate (I[cDougal, Book Review
(1941) 54 HAv. L. REa. 526, 529) that "the increasing physical interdependence of all
our land uses and the economic interdependence of all our activities centered about land
have made the classic dichotomy between 'public' and 'private," at least in so far as
housing is concerned, "not only fruitless but positively harmful"
59. See note 13 supra.
60. Russell, 384.
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or a proven state of facts to the effect that the property of the authority
in question was held for a charitable or public purpose."0 1 He adds
that "should this state of facts be challenged in a case involving an
authority with tenants of substantial income, the long line of cases up-
holding the tax-exempt status of other authorities would not be a prece-
dent."62 In view of the fact that most of these twenty-three courts were
dealing with state housing statutes which specifically provide for the
housing, not of paupers, but of people of moderate income who cannot
afford decent housing, 3 this conclusion is, to say the least, a bit startling.
It may be presumed that the courts read the statutes whose validity they
were determining. 4 The Ohio Court, at least, does not affirmatively
support this charge of judicial irresponsibility; it merely ignores the
other state decisions without making any attempt to distinguish them.
By such silence, it appears to stand only on the technical ground that
the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions are not controlling on an
Ohio court. The Court does not, however, make it clear why housing
policy should vary so greatly in Ohio or why it should be so oblivious to
the policy considerations found persuasive by all other courts.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Most Housing Authorities Laws provide that rentals may be fixed so as to pro-
duce revenues which (together with all other available moneys) will be sufficient to pay
debt service, operating and maintenance costs, administrative expenses, and to create
debt service reserves. Also, by express provision, most of these Laws permit tenants
who have, and only such tenants as have, aggregate annual incomes not in excess of
five (in the case of larger families, six) times the annual rental. Most Housing Authori-
ties Laws further provide for tenancy by persons of "low incomnc" and define such per-
sons merely as persons who lack the amount necessary to enable them, without financial
assistance, to live in decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings without overcrowding. See
for example Arizona Municipal Housing Law, Laws 1939, c. 82, §§ 3, 9, 10; Arkansas
Housing Authorities Law, Act 298 of 1937, as amended, §§ 3(k), 9, 10; Georgia Housing
Authorities Law, Act 411 of 1937, as amended, §§3(j), 9, 10; Maryland Housing Au-
thorities Law, Laws 1937, c. 517, as amended, § 1(3) (j), 1(9), 1(10); Mississillpi
Housing Authorities Law, Laws 1938, c. 338, as amended, §§ 1 (k), 7, 8; Oregon I-ous-
ing Authorities Law, Laws 1937, c. 442, as amended, §3 3(j), 9, 10; Pennsylvania Hous-
ing Authorities Law, 1937, Pub. L. 955, as amended, 33 3(o), 12, 13; Washington Hlous-
ing Authorities Law, Laws 1939, c. 23, as amended, §§3(j), 9, 10. These provisiouns
clearly indicate that the legislatures contemplated tenants who might not be in the pauper
class or whose income would not be extremely uncertain.
64. These courts have, in fact, been explicit in indicating their realization that the
projects must serve families whose income Mr. Russell apparently would consider as
"substantial." Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles v. Dockweiler, 14
Cal. (2d) 437, 461, 94 P. (2d) 794, 806, 807 (1939); Williamson v. Housing Authority
of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 186 Ga. 673, 677, 199 S. E. 43, 47 (1938) ; Allydonn
Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 295, 23 N. E. (2d) 665,
668, 669 (1939) ; it re Brewster Street Housing Site in the City of Detroit, 291 Mich.
313, 339, 289 N. W. 493, 503 (1939) ; Chapman v. Huntington, W. Va., Housing Author.
ity, 121 W. Va. 319, 326, 3 S. E. (2d) 502, 506 (1939).
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In its contention that tax exemption for low-rent housing projects
is a denial of "equal protection," the Ohio-Russell theory defies, still
again, any reasonable comprehension in terms of contemporary economic
realities and judicial precedent. This contention underlies the reasoning
of the entire Russell article and is expressed by the Ohio Court in its
brief statement that a tax advantage "given to a selected few persons
who are not paupers and who are not aged, infirm or without means
of support is violative of the provisions of . . . Section 2 of Article I
of the Constitution of Ohio." ' , But neither Mr. Russell nor the Ohio
Court attempts to give the argument any, much less a persuasive,
meaning. 6 Admittedly part of the cost of any such project, whether
supplied by tax exemption or more direct municipal subsidy, must be
borne by the body of local taxpayers. Admittedly such projects must
benefit those who cannot otherwise afford healthful housing in a some-
what greater degree than those who are fortunate enough to be able
to provide their own decent living quarters -although no one would
argue that the resulting elimination of slums does not benefit everyone
in the community. But in terms of either policy or of well-settled
judicial precedent, it is difficult to see how a contention that such exemp-
tion violates the equal protection clause, merely because its immediate
benefits are not distributed equally among the income earners of the
population, 7 can be seriously advanced today. One might as well argue
65. Columbus case, 442.
66. The case of State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N. _. (2d) 634
(1937) which the Ohio Court cites in its syllabus, held valid the exemption for certain
periods of the property, other than real estate used for railroad purposes, of interurban
railroad companies. It is somewhat difficult to see how such a decision can be extrapo-
lated into authority for a holding that a low-rent public housing project violates the
equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution.
67. It may be objected, invoking the legal syntax on a higher level of generalim-
tion, that the Ohio Court is merely holding any "classification unreasonable" which in-
cludes other than paupers. But by drawing the line with paupers and hence excluding
any portion of the population beyond thfe pauper-line, the Court is in effect holding that
any classification which includes a part, but not the whole, of the income earning popu-
lation is unreasonable.
This all-or-nothing attitude, for determining "equality" or "reasonableness of classi-
fication," may have its roots in a now generally repudiated test-availability of use for
the entire public-for determining the validity of exercises of the power of eminent
domain. The present impotence of that test even in eminent domain is well illustrated
by a long line of decisions holding projects actually benefiting only a single "entity" to
be for a public use. Thus the condemnation of a right of .%ay, for a logging railroad
to serve a single company has been upheld [Goose Creek Lumber Co. v. White, 219 Ky.
739, 294 S. V. 494 (1927)]; a right of way for an aerial bucket line has been held
validly granted to a mining company [Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold 'Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527 (1906)]; condemnation for an irrigation system primarily benefiting a
single land owner has been sustained [Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112 (1896)]; the provision of a right of way across neighboring land for the enlarge-
ment of an individual's irrigation ditch has been upheld [Clark v. Nash, 193 U. S. 361
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that all of the tax money collected from the Rockefellers, the Morgans,
and the Mellons should be returned to the Rockefellers, the Morgans,
and the Mellons, or that all of the tax money collected from Wall Street
should be spent within the area of Wall Street. If unequal distribution
of benefit alone were sufficient to invalidate either a tax or a tax
exemption measure, every such measure would fall, since all such mea-
sures necessarily contemplate a benefit to some members of a community
which is not shared to the same extent by all other members. Present
day courts, recognizing this fact, have been almost unanimous in reject-
ing such an argument if the benefited class is not arbitrarily selected,
and if the purpose in other respects serves the general public welfare. 8
Excellent summary is offered by the Georgia Supreme Court in disposing
of this same argument in Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta :09
"It might also be claimed that the actual benefits derived from
maintaining the Georgia Academy for the Blind are limited to
blind children . . or that adults are denied the actual benefits
of the public school system because the schools are maintained only
for children between certain ages . . . It is no violation of the
constitutional guaranty here invoked for the State to provide direct
benefits for a certain group, to the exclusion of other citizens, unless
done by arbitrary standards. The governing authorities were well
justified in limiting to those of moderate income the benefits of
(1905)]. Adequately summing up the state of authority are the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co.,
240 U. S. 30, 32 (1916): "The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal
test is established." See also MacAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CALIF.
L. Rav. 241, 243-244; Nichols, The Meaning of 'Public Use in the Law of E nti
Domain (1940) 20 B. U. L. REv. 615, 618-624; Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1519, 1522.
Mr. Justice Crouch, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals in New York City
Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 342, 1 N. E. (2d) 153, 155 (1936), stated
in connection with the concept of public as distinguished from private use:
"Use of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and any-
body is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use." (Citing numerous
cases).
See also Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atd. 834 (1938).
68. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); Carmichael v.
Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937). For state decisions rejecting this
same argument in cases involving state housing statutes, see particularly Humphrey v.
Phoenix, 55 Ariz. 374, 102 P. (2d) 82 (1940); Hogue v. Housing Authority of
North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263, 144 S. W. (2d) 49 (1940); Housing Authority of
Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S. W. (2d) 79 (1940); Edwards v. Housing
Authority of City of Muncie, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N. E. (2d) 741 (1939) ; Spahn v. Stew-
art, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S. W. (2d) 651 (1937).
It should be observed that no showing has ever been made that the "classification"
of people to be housed under the USHA local authority plan is unreasonable. Tak-
ing into consideration what recent inventories have shown to be the state of housing
conditions in this county, it is difficult to see how such a showing could be made.
69. 186 Ga. 673, 677, 199 S. E. 43, 47 (1938).
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the legislation under discussion. The statute makes a classification
and states the basis thereof, which cannot be said by this court to
be unreasonable."
The next major difficulty of the Ohio-Russell theory is that, in its
offhand rejection of express legislative declarations of public purpose,
without factual investigation adequate to show the unreasonableness of
such declarations, it completely reverses contemporary notions of the
relative functions of judiciary and legislature. Most courts, recognizing
that "it is not the function of a court to determine whether the public
policy that finds expression in legislation of this order is well or ill
conceived,""0 and that proper respect for a coordinate branch of the
government requires that all reasonable doubts about the constitutionality
of a statute be resolved in its favor,71 have sought strenuously to give
effect to legislative declarations of public purpose, especially in the case
of government owned projects.72 This general principle of judicial hu-
mility has seldom been better stated than by Judge Ladd of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in a famous case upholding municipal sub-
sidy of a private railroad :7
"Enough has been said to show the delicate nature of the task
imposed upon the court when they are called upon to revise the
judgment of the legislature in a matter of this description . . .
because the rule to be applied is furnished, not so much by the law
as by those general considerations of public policy and political
economy to which allusion has been made. I do not deny the
power and duty of the court, when private rights of property are
in question, to settle those rights according to a just interpretation
of the constitution; and the discharge of that duty may involve a
revision of the judgment of the legislature upon a question which,
70. The quoted words are those of Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court,
in Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 42 (1933) (Maryland
statute, exempting from taxation the property of a specific railroad, sustained).
71. This presumption is of course as old as the judicial power to declare statutes
invalid. For discussion see Hamilton and Braden, The Special Compclence of the Su-
preme Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319 passi m. A recent leading case is O'Gorman v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931), where Mr. Justice Brandeis insist-
ed upon a "factual foundation of record," showing inappropriateness of remedy or non-
existence of assumed evils, before a statute exercising the police power could be held
unconstitutional. No policy reason exists for distinguishing exercises of the tax or
spending power.
72. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920); Jones v. Portland, 113 Mie. 123, 93 At.
41 (1915), aff'd, 245 U. S. 217 (1917); Humphrey v. Phoeni., 55 Ariz. 374, 102 P.
(2d) 82 (1940); Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263,
144 S. IV. (2d) 49 (1940); Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles v. Deck-
weiler, 14 Cal. (2d) 437, 94 P. (2d) 794 (1939).
73. Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514, 533 (1876). Though this particular case dealt
with a subsidy to a private railroad, Judge Ladd's reasoning is a fortliori applicable to
statutory subsidies to public authorities.
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like this, partakes more or less of a political character. But before
the court can reverse the judgment of the legislature and the execu-
tive, and declare a statute levying or authorizing a tax to be in-
operative and void, a very clear case must be shown."
It has been the custom of all courts, even when guillotining legislation,
to pay at least verbal deference to this principle. Yet Mr. Russell ignores
it entirely, unless his implication that the legislators who included express
declarations of public purpose in their housing statutes did not know
or did not mean what they were saying can be considered as sufficient
treatment. The Ohio Court, though it does in the Columbus case profess
a duty "to give a statute a constitutional construction, if possible,"
74
invokes the premise to justify its giving a meaning - that tax exemp-
tion was not intended - to the Ohio Housing Authority Act contrary
to what most people had regarded as a clearly expressed legislative
intent. It nowhere subscribes to the premise that, assuming the inter-
pretation which most objective observers would give the statute, every
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality as
so interpreted; on the contrary, to rationalize its own peculiar inter-
pretation, it assumes almost without argument, certainly without the
requisite factual showing, that the statute, as commonly interpreted,
would be unconstitutional. By such open legerdemain the Court was
able to substitute its own outmoded laissez-faire economic notions for
the policy considerations expressed by the people through their legisla-
tive representatives.
Even assuming, however, that express legislative intent to provide
tax exemption for USHA-qualified housing projects is to be ignored,
the Ohio-Russell theory is still forced to dispose of general tax exemp-
tion statutes which provide, as did the Ohio statute, for exemption of
"public property" held for "public purposes." This it achieves only by
continuing its policy of going contra to what is elsewhere regarded as
settled law and policy. It adopts the strange position that such general
statutory exemptions are to be strictly construed even for public proper-
ty. The proposition that tax exemptions are to be construed strictly is,
when put in proper context, orthodox enough. But the Ohio Court's
addition of the statement that it sees "no reason for a distinction being
made in the case of publicly owned property" (citing cases involving
private property in support of its position) 5 is certainly contrary to the
74. Columbus case, 440.
75. Columbits case, 440. The citations given by the Court are Lee v. Sturges, 46
Ohio St. 153, 19 N. E. 560 (1889) (taxability of privately owned shares of railroad and
telegraph company stock) ; In re Taylor's Estate, 139 Ohio St. 417, 40 N. E. (2d) 936
(1942) (taxability of a bequest to a society whose sole object was to encourage wider
circulation of the Bible); and Cullitan v. Cunningham Sanitarium, 134 Ohio St. 99, W0
N. E. (2d) 205 (1938) (taxability of a privately owned sanitarium claiming exclusive
use for a charitable purpose).
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generally accepted rule which holds that, once property is admitted to
be public, the burden of clearly proving that it does not fall within
an exemption provision rests on officials attempting to enforce taxa-
tion. 6 The courts have found little sense and much waste of adminis-
trative effort in a governmental unit's merely transferring money from
one pocket to another.77 It is clearly sheer folly for a local community,
after it has assumed the financial burdens of a low-rent housing project,
to seek to charge itself with either taxes, or the cost of collecting taxes,
on project property. What public purpose could be served by requiring
such intramural buckpassing is difficult to see; even the most "strict"
construction of general exemption statutes should preclude it. Yet Mr.
Russell disposes of both policy and precedent by stating flatly: "The
ownership of the property by a religious, educational, charitable or public
body is beside the point."1
7 8
Nor does the emphasis of the Ohio-Russell theory upon tense or time
add persuasiveness to its dubious and eccentric presumption about the
taxability of publicly owned property. The argument, as the Ohio Court
puts it in the Columbus case, is that the proper question is not whether
the property of a public housing authority was (presumably while the
buildings were being erected) exempt as public property being used
76. See Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes (1929) 7 Tax. L. rZ% 385, 401:
"The reasons given for the rule of strict construction do not apply to the
exemption of public property. It may be said that it is contrary to the policy
of the state to exempt the property of individuals from taxation and that 'taxa-
tion is the rule, exemption the exception.' But it would seem that the state's
policy would be to exempt its own property, and the burden of proof falls upon
the officials attempting to enforce the tax, once it is admitted that the property
is public property." (Citing cases).
Compare Stimson, Exemption of Publicly Owncd Property from Taxation (1934)
8 U. oF Cix. L. REv. 32; Comment (1935) 44 Y&xa L. J. 1075, 1037; (1936) 35 Mcir.
L. REv. 172.
77. This attitude on the part of the courts was well summed up in Its re Hamilton,
148 N. Y. 310, 42 N. E. 717 (1896). Speaking of publicly owned property, the court
said:
"The end and purpose of all taxation is to raise revenue for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of government, and since no revenue could be raised by
imposing taxes on property owned by the state itself, or by any of its political
divisions, such property is in no just or practical sense the subject of taxa-
tion. It is never supposed to be included in the terms of any law providing for
the imposition of taxes, however general it may be, not because it is exempt, in
the sense in which that term is generally understood, but for the reason that,
in the nature of things, it never was, and never can be, taxable."
In fact the rule, as stated in some jurisdictions, is that the legislative purpose to impose
a tax on publicly owned property is never to be implied, and, unless the purpose to tax
is clearly expressed, it will be presumed not to be intended. See In ro Opinions of the
Justices, 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535 (193S); Housing Authority of Los Angeles County
v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. (2d) 437, 94 P. (2d) 794 (1939).
78. Russell, 384.
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exclusively for public purposes, but rather whether such property is
presently used exclusively for any public purpose. Mr. Russell's
question, as has been indicated above, is whether the project has ceased
to lift "the very lowest, slum-level families"" out of slums and has
begun to cater to families "above the lowest or slum-level income
group." ' So much emphasis on tense or time- or, more accurately,
the changing functions of a housing project- completely ignores what
must be the necessary interdependence of "rehousing" and "slum clear-
ance" in any comprehensive and effective program.81 Furthermore,
reiteration of the word "exclusively," though the Ohio Court devotes
much attention to it, adds no meaning to constitutional provisions like
those of Ohio. The word is surplusage;82 even if it is not included, it is
implied. It can be conceded that the purpose must be exclusively public in
order to justify tax exemption. 8  It can be further conceded that a
79. Rursell, 383.
80. Russell, 384.
81. This interdependence was clearly recognized by the Ohio Court in its earlier
opinion in State ex rel. Ellis v. Sherrill, 136 Ohio St. 328, 331, 25 N. E. (2d) 844, 845
(1940). The Court enumerated the purposes of the United States Housing Act of 1937
in the following words:
"(1) the eradication of so-called slum areas . ..and (2) as a concomnitant
thercof, the furnishing of low-rent dwellings to families of low incomes." (emt-
phasis added).
The Court then went on to say:
"An examination of the evidence presented in the pending case shows on
the whole a carefully conceived and balanced plan to abolish selected slum areas
in the city of Cincinnati and to provide low-rent dwelling units within the
municipal limits for families of low incomes, in general conformity with the
purpose and design of the controlling legislation.
"If a plan as formulated by a local authority comes within the purview
of the housing act and meets the approval of the National Housing Authority,
whereby it is willing to lend federal funds in furtherance thereof, a court may
not interfere."
82. 1 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 174.
83. See 2 id. at § 685:
"'Exclusively' used, according to the better considered decisions, means
the primary and inherent use and does not preclude such incidental uses as are
directly connected with, essential to, and in furtherance of, the primary use."
The Ohio Court was not the only judicial body to be confronted with the words
"exclusively for a public purpose" in a constitutional provision limiting the legislative
power to tax. The Constitutions of Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee and South Carolina,
for example, contain the same words. Yet the courts of these states, properly interpret-
ing the meaning of these words and understanding the true nature of public housing
projects, had no difficulty in finding that such projects unquestionably qualified tinder
such words. Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263, 144 S. W.
(2d) 49 (1940); State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941);
McNulty v. Owens, 188 S. C. 377, 199 S. E. 425 (1938) ; Knoxville Housing Authority
v. Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76, 123 S. W. (2d) 1085 (1939).
The case of Cincinnati v. Lewis, 66 Ohio St. 49, 63 N. E. 588 (1902), relied
upon by the Ohio Court in its syllabus, interpreted an exemption statute to exclude land
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use which once was public or charitable but has ceased to be such, is
entitled to no exemption. 4 But such concessions are irrelevant. If the
Ohio Court had followed prevailing legal and policy norms in its deter-
mination of what constitutes a public purpose, all of these technical require-
ments would have been met; the project would have been found to be
both presently and exclusively for such a purpose.
It is indeed only by the most specious reasoning that the decision of
the Ohio Court can be made consistent with that Court's own previously,
and recently, announced judicial policy. Only by taking the position,
described above, that in the Columbus case it was not determining the
constitutionality of a statute but was merely interpreting a statute in
such a way as to avoid making it unconstitutional, was the court techni-
cally able to maintain an appearance of consistency with its former
decision in State ex rel. Ellis v. Sherrill.8" In issuing mandamus to
compel the city manager of Cincinnati to sign a contract with the local
housing authority, this decision clearly upheld the constitutionality
of the Ohio Housing Authority Statute. The contract, signature of
which was decreed, included the provision that the city would fur-
nish municipal services to the property for a service charge, smaller in
amount than full taxes, in lieu of such taxes.80  The case was twice
briefed and twice argued orally before the Ohio Supreme Court; the
first time upon the Cincinnati Housing Authority's demurrer to the seven
defenses advanced by the city manager of Cincinnati, in which the
Court sustained all but the demurrer to the third defense;67 the second
owned by the city of Cincinnati, but located in another taxing district, and rented out
for farming purposes (though the money paid by the tenants was used in maintaining
the w -ater department of the city). It is difficult to see what bearing this case has on
the exemption of a low-rent housing project, which is rented not indiscriminately to
all comers at market prices, but only to those of specified need and at rentals based on
capacity to pay.
It is interesting to contrast the attitude of the Ohio Court in holding, in the case of
American Issue Pub. Co. v. Evatt, 137 Ohio St. 264, 28 N. E. (2d) 613 (1940),
that a publishing company incorporated for profit, but controlled by another, non-profit,
association, organized solely for the purpose of temperance education, was "an institu-
tion used exclusively for charitable purposes" within the Ohio Constitution and statutes.
84. It may be appropriate, when private property is used for purposes other than
those for which exemption was granted, to revoke the exemption. But when public prop-
erty is used for purposes alien to those for which it was acquired, the action which would
appear most precisely to fit the crime is an action to compel the public officers to do
their duty. Mandamus, a mandatory injunction, or an action for removal could cure
the evil without disruption of public service.
85. 136 Ohio St. 328, 25 N. E. (2d) 844 (1940).
86. Record (called the "Pleadings" as printed) in State ex rel. Ellis v. Sherrill
(No. 27410) pp. 9-10, being paragraphs numbered 13 and 14 of the contract between the
city of Cincinnati and the Cincinnati Housing Authority.
87. While no opinion was rendered on this decision, the Court entered the follow-
ing upon its Journal:
"This cause came on to be heard upon the demurrer of the relator generally
to the allegations contained in the answer to relator's petition and in the an-
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time upon the issue of facts raised by this third defense, this decision
also being in favor of the Housing Authority."8 The fourth, fifth and
sixth defenses in the answer of the Cincinnati city manager included
attacks on the Housing Authority Act and the proposed contract as in
violation of both Section 2, Article I (the equal protection clause) and
Section 2, Article XII (the clause limiting the legislative power to grant
tax exemption) of the Ohio Constitution, on the grounds, inter alia,
that the "private" and "competitive" nature of the enterprise and the
receipt of service charges by the city in lieu of taxes violated these
sections.89 In sustaining the demurrer to these answers, the Court would
seem clearly to have both considered and adjudicated these issues in favor
of the validity of the Housing Authority Act.
It has been sufficiently demonstrated above that the Ohio Court in
the Columbus case could make sense of the rationale that it was merely
interpreting a statute in order to avoid making it unconstitutional only
by assuming the unexpressed premise that a statute explicitly granting
tax exemption to a public housing project is unconstitutional. Since
a contrary determination was required for the Sherrill decision, it is
difficult to see how the Ohio Court, consistently with stare decisis, can
now justify its assumption of such a premise.
But whatever the logical tergiversations *of the Ohio Court in its
dismissal of the Sherrill case, the practical effect of its present decision,
as the Court must have realized, is to nullify the Ohio Housing Authority
Act. Because of both a constitutional tax limitation"0 and a statutory
swer to the amendment and supplement to the petition, and specially to the
second defense of the answer on the ground that the respondent has not the
legal capacity to maintain the second defense, and was argued by counsel.
"On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged that the demurrer
be, and the same hereby is, sustained as to the second, fourth, fifth, sixth and
seventh defenses, but overruled as to the third defense contained in said an-
swer.
"It is ordered that relator be granted 20 days within which to plead fur-
ther."
Docket No. 27410, Court Journal 35, page 441, January Term, Supreme Court of Ohio,
decided June 21, 1939.
88. The issue raised by this defense was whether the project planned would consti-
tute low rent housing as defined by the USHA and would be slum clearance within the
meaning of the Act. It is the decision on this phase of the case which is reported in
State ex rel. Ellis v. Sherrill.
89. Record (Pleadings) in State e.r ret. Ellis v. Sherrill (No. 27410) pp. 12-18-
Answer by City M1anager to Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
90. "No property, taxed according to value, shall be so taxed in excess of one
per cent of its true value in money for all state and local purposes, but laws
may be passed authorizing additional taxes to be levied outside of such limita-
tion, either when approved by at least a majority of the electors of the taxing
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debt limit,9 local units in Ohio are for all practical purposes prevented
from agreeing to make the USHA-required 20%o local contributions
in cash. Hence, if tax exemption cannot be substituted for such con-
tributions, USHA will have to stop its annual contributions. The
inevitable result must then be, unless the USHA itself takes over the
projects and thus continues their tax exemption as federally owned
property,92 that project administrators will be forced to charge full
"economic" rents, thus excluding the low income families for whom the
project was built and making impossible of achievement one of tie
major objectives of the program. If, furthermore, the certainty of tax
exemption is denied to local housing authorities, since it is such certainty
which alone insures the continued local contributions upon which the
federal contributions are by law conditioned, it will become impossible
for municipalities to sell the bonds by which they raise their original
10% down payment. Both the USHA and private capital wisely require
long-term commitments. Because of these practical effects of the deci-
sion, the nice distinction that technically the constitutionality of the Ohio
Housing Authority Act is unimpeached can hardly impress proponents
of slum clearance and public housing in Ohio. It should prove especially
unpersuasive both to those administering the various Ohio housing au-
thorities, who, in reliance on the practical meaning of the Sherrill
decision, 3 had proceeded to borrow money and let construction contracts,
district voting on such proposition, or when provided for by the charter of a
Municipal Corporation . . ." OHIo Co.-sT. Art. XII, §2.
OHIo GEN. CODE Axx. (Page, 1938), §5625-15, provides that a two-thirds vote of the
members of a political subdivision may, on specified conditions and for specified pur-
poses, authorize the taxing authority of any such subdivision to levy a tax in excess of
this limitation.
91. OHio GE.;. CoDE AxN. (Page, 1937) § 2293-14. It is common Imowledge that
many Ohio cities have reached, or exceeded, their debt limitations. See § 2 of the special
Act, 115 LAws OF OHIO 601 (1933), which was passed to enable municipalities to par-
ticipate in federal projects free from the restrictions of the debt limitations of the Onio
GE.. CODE ANx. (Page, 1937) 9§ 2293-14 to2293-18. This Act was declared an emer-
gency law because "Under the existing law a great many municipalities and other sub-
divisions of Ohio have issued bonds up to their debt limitations." See also 117 LAv,s
OF Omo 826 (1938). In § 2 of that Act a legislative finding is recited that "the limita-
tion on the net indebtedness now established by law precludes many subdivisions from
participation in federal aid for necessary projects . . ." Investigation would probably
reveal that Columbus itself is close to, if not over, the line.
92. This is what the USHA now plans to do. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1942, § 1,
p. 48, col. 4.
93. That the Ohio authorities and the Federal Government were justified in bliev-
ing that the case decided that such projects were tax exempt is confirmed by the reason-
ing and decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals of Franklin County in its unreported
opinion, dated Dec. 28, 1940, in State cx rel. Bartlett v. Thatcher [rc,'d on other
grounds, 138 Ohio St. 235, 34 N. E.' (2d) 440 (1941)]. In its opinion in this case, which
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52: 42
and to the investors who have purchased the bonds of such authorities 4
To many people it must have seemed that if there was ever a case which
called for the application of stare decisis, this was such a case. 0
The most disturbing aspect of the Ohio-Russell theory is, however,
in a final question it raises - assuming that its proponents will follow
a consistent policy - about the exercise of governmental powers other
than tax exemption. If tax exemption is to be denied to government
owned housing projects catering to tenants of the lower-income third
of our population, what of direct contributions to such projects? If
some ambitious Ohio city should miraculously overcome its debt limita-
tions and succeed in interesting the USHA and private capital without
the aid of tax exemption, can it now constitutionally - in the light of
the Columbus decision- make direct contributions from tax receipts
by way of providing its portion of the necessary annual subsidy for a
public housing project? Tax exemption and direct grant, as methods
of subsidizing public housing, are obviously functional equivalents.'
involved the same property and the same parties as were involved in the Columbus case.
the court interpreted the Sherrill decision as follows:
"We do not understand the plaintiff in the instant case is seriously con-
testing the proposition that the property included in Poindexter Village is public
property. The gravamen of his contention is that the property is being rented
for private tse and by reason of that fact is not used exclusively for public use.
In our judgment this question was necessarily raised in the Sherrill case, where-
in was urged the unconstitutionality of the act ...
"The stipulation or agreed statement of facts sets out that in the rental of
the several units in Poindexter Village the provisions of the act have been
complied with.
"When this is admitted nothing renuzins. We quite agree that where the
public use is diverted to a private use the premises would lose their right of
exemption from taxation. Counsel for plaintiff urge very persuasively that the
renting of the various units to individuals for private use as a home is not a
public use, but, as heretofore stated, this was necessarily the question that was
before the Supreme Court in the Sherrill case . . ." (emphasis added).
See also the dissent of Judges Williams and Zimmerman in the Columnbus case, at 442:
"Such action [reversal of the decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
refusing tax exemption] would be in harmony with the decision in the case of
State ex rel. Ellis, City Solicitor v. Sherrill, City Manager."
'94. $489,000 of the bonds of the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority were
purchased and are now owned by Ohio state sinking funds, consisting of the State Teach-
ers' Retirement Fund, the Public Employees' Retirement Fund, and the Public School
Employees' Retirement System.
95. In Meyers v. Rose Institute, 92 Ohio St. 238, 249, 110 N. E. 929, 932 (1915), the
Ohio Court suggested that, where a charitable institution had been induced to Invest
funds in personal property by the apparent fixed policy of the state, as expressed in jttdi-
cial decisions, that charitable institutions could not be taxed on such investments, the
case was most appropriate for the application of stare decisis.
96. Proponents of public housing have no cause to be apologetic on policy grounds
about tax exemption as a method of subsidizing public housing. Tax exemption places
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It does not seem possible that anyone could seriously argue that tax
exemption involves more of an expenditure of public funds than an
outright state or municipal grant of funds, and no persuasive policy
reason has ever been stated for making a difference in the constitution-
ality of the two. 7 The fact is, however, that courts, apparently thinking
tax exemption the less painful form of subsidy, have always been more
lenient in permitting tax exemption than they have outright grants.0S
no greater burden on other property owners than does direct grant. Unfortunate as it
is that most local revenues are today collected from an antiquated, regressive "real es-
tate" tax, there is no more reason to postpone public housing, than to postpone any other
governmental function, until the day when the whole local tax structure has been com-
pletely reformed. Mr. Coleman Woodbury, in CITIZENS' HotsInG CoUN.IL oF N. Y,
LocAL TAXAT'ION AND HousING (1939) 66, has well said:
"Nearly all of the drawbacks in tax reduction as a housing subsidy, simply
reveal underlying weaknesses in the present system of local government finances.
Housing officials themselves are not responsible for these weaknesses. There
can be no sense in trying to take out upon this new governmental activity the
spite and bad feeling that has accumulated from failure to adapt local taxation
to a twentieth century urban civilization."
Nor, it might be added, are the occupants of substandard housing responsible for the
inequities of local' taxation.
Indeed tax exemption of public housing projects can be regarded as a belated, crude,
and indirect recognition that our traditional "real estate" tax is in effect just a sales
tax on homes. Cf. Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing (193S) 43
YA.E L. J. 240. Exemption for the purpose of protecting a minimum standard of sub-
sistence, if not of healthful living-such as homestead exemptions and income tax de-
ductions-has, furthermore, long been regarded as consistent with the social and eco-
nomic norms of our society. See Grovas, FIx.-CING GotN:MaZxT (1939) 4S9.
The argument that exemption of public housing projects may eventually imperil the
"whole local tax structure" is too optimistic. It is most unlikely that public authori-
ties will in the calculable future be able to build on so grand a scale. There will be time
enough to take care of the tax problem when such a miracle appears. It would be a
great additional public service-clear "unearned increment---if the public housing pro-
gram should succeed in forcing quicker public response to the urgent needs both of ex-
panding tax areas and of shifting to less regressive forms of taxation.
97. Mr. Russell (at 384) suggests that "the most forthright approach to the
problem would be proposals to amend the state constitutions expressly to authorize the
exemption" of housing projects. If such exemption is attended by so many anti-social
consequences, as Mr. Russell alleges, that courts cannot reasonably define "public pur-
pose" to include such exemption, why should a change in the method by which exemp-
tion is obtained work a change in the consequences?
93. See Stimson, Exen ption of Properiy from Taxation (1934) IS M1 ;:;. L REV.
411, 419:
"An ex-amination of court opinions discloses the fact that legislation grant-
ing indirect subsidies, in the form of tax exemption, is upheld by the courts,
even though a direct subsidy to the same institutions would be denied under the
doctrine of direct public purpose. This is amply illustrated in the case of
churches, sectarian schools, and private industrial enterprises . . . Courts quitu
generally have failed to see that tax exemption is a subsidy whose burden rests
upon taxpayers."
See also Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes (192) 7 Tax. L. REv. 50.
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Hence, since the public purpose concept is now universally held to limit
governmental power directly or indirectly to raise or spend tax funds
in every jurisdiction, it'does not seem possible for the Ohio Court to
escape from the conclusion that if a typical USI-IA-approved project is
not a public purpose for tax exemption purposes, a fortiori such projects
are not legitimate purposes for which state or local funds can be spent
either directly by outright grant or indirectly by the use of government
credit."
It is apparent from the above that any finding that a project is not
for a public purpose unless it provides only for those of the lowest
income, coupled with a definition of "lowest" so narrow that it is
synonymous with pauperism, will effectively scuttle the possibilities of par-
ticipation in the USHA program by any localities in that jurisdiction.
It is also apparent that such a decision, if its definition of public pur-
pose carries the concomitant denial of any use of municipal funds or
credit, will equally prevent the undertaking of any similar program, not
dependent on federal aid, by a state or municipal government unit. Hence
there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the consequence
of the Ohio-Russell doctrine is to prevent all local housing. projects, how-
ever financed, except "poor houses" donating their quarters to paupers. 100
It is not our purpose, by this meticulous criticism, to exaggerate the
importance of a single court decision, or of a single bar journal article,
which seeks to overthrow prevailing notions of law and policy. It scarcely
seems likely that an aberrant, medieval ideology, stemming from a time
when everyman's house was his "castle," will be able to make much
headway against the political, social, and economic factors which today
condition the housing and planning program. But when a reactionary
doctrine gets loose in the law books there is no predicting to what uses
unimaginative men or men of ill will may put it. The real danger of
the Ohio-Russell theory lies in its implications for the vast proposed
post-war program of rebuilding our cities and towns; a program which
is being designed not only to provide all citizens with healthful homes
in livable communities, but also to cushion postwar unemployment and
to salvage what is worth preserving in the many institutions - munici-
pal, banking, insurance, and charitable -whose future is so largely
dependent on land values. The urgency of the "land-use" problems
which will confront the country in the postwar era admits of no doubt.
Even now numerous governmental agencies and private organizations
99. If, furthermore, such projects are not for a "public purpose" to sustain a grant
of funds, how rational is it to hold that they are for a "public use" to sustain a grant of
eminent domain? Of what value is a power to condemn, if there is no power to pay?
100. We do not overlook the possibility of a wholly federal program. Whether Cot-
gress can be persuaded to be so generous with federal funds is, however, still an open
question.
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are working on the necessary plans. Most of these plans call for wide-
scale governmental acquisition of land, to be followed by redevelopment
and rebuilding of business centers, transportation terminals, residential
areas, and public improvements, by both public and private agencies."'
If it is not a "public purpose" for a municipality to contribute one-fifth
of the subsidy necessary to house its under-privileged citizens who cannot
otherwise secure healthful homes, how much less for a public purpose
must be all of the multiple governmental activities which will be required
to make effective these post-war plans? Yet such plans must be made
effective if the nation is even to begin to achieve the housing and plan-
ning goals which now have indubitable public acceptance. Technological
resources and manpower will be ample for the implementation of almost
any conceivable program. Is it credible that an obsolete, absolutistic,
static concept of public purpose, grounded only on a laisse.-faire policy
of letting the devil take the hindmost, will be allowed to block the way?
The necessities of a world soon to come must reconsign the Ohio-Russell
theory to the oblivion whence it came.
101. See CONFERENCE ON URnANISm, Harvard University (Greer, ed.), Tim Proll.n
oF THE CITIES ANDh TowNs (1942); GRa AND HANSEN, URBAN RUEBEVLOPI.' T AD
HOUsING (1941); FEDERAL HOUSING ADmiNILStTiox, A HANDBooR o:. Unwa.- RE-
DEVEoPM -T FOR CITIES I.'N THE UNITED STATES (1941); and the publications of NA-
Tio.AL RESoURcEs PLANNING BOAm: PUBLIC LAND Ac-UIsiTioN, PAirm II: UrXAN
LANDS (1941), NATIONA. RESOURCFS DEELOPMENT ZRI"r (1942), ArM THE Vhrn-
FULL EmPLOYMxT (1942), THE HoUSE BUILDING INDUsTRY (1942), BETrMr CITI s
(1942). Charles Ascher, author of the last mentioned pamphlet, urges (at 21) :
"Let us not quail before the magnitude of the task. A nation that can or-
ganize itself for the conduct of xar as the United States is now'; organizing,
should have no lack of confidence in its ability to carry out any task that it
wills."
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